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I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most intellectually challenging legal question which
has baffled jurists might have been answered by the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.' It is the question of whether
Congress has the power to eliminate all the subject matter jurisdiction of
article III courts.2 Congress took a bold step in 1996 with the Anti-
* Orville McKenzie is a graduate magna cum laude of Orlando College, Orlando, FL
and is a Juris Doctor Candidate 1998, at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law
Center. I dedicate this article to my grandfather, Lewis Parkes (Brother Lewis), who passed
away in January 1997. I would also like to thank Eddie Williams, III for his constructive
criticism of the many, drafts of this article.
1. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996).
2. "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish .... . U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1.
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Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,3 which eliminates all judicial
review of a final order of deportation when an immigrant is deportable by
reason of the commission of a criminal violation.4 Obviously, immigration
law goes beyond the courts of any nation, and in fact affects the
international community in the form of migration and forcible repatriation.
This Comment examines this constitutional question from an
immigration perspective and breaks the analysis down into four sections to
give the reader a better means to understand this complex, yet ever
changing area of law. Section two provides rudimentary knowledge about
federal court subject matter jurisdiction and thus leads into the second
section which enumerates criminal ground for deportation in Australia,
France, Canada, England, and the United States. As will be evident from
the discussion infra, all five countries have different standards for
deportation of criminal aliens., The homogeneous characteristic among
Australia, France, Canada, and England is that a detached judiciary has
jurisdiction to review orders of deportation. The exception is the United
States. Is the American policy wise? Why is it that expeditious
deportation of criminal aliens trumps the procedural safeguard of having
one's case reviewed by a detached and independent judiciary?
Section four provides an in-depth analysis of the constitutionality
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act as it relates to the
truncation of federal court subject matter jurisdiction. The impetus for the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act was the Oklahoma City
bombing. 6 Many lives were lost, people felt insecure, thus they concluded
3. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 110 Stat. 1214.
4. Id.
5. In Australia, a criminal alien is deportable if crime committed punishable by a
sentence of one year or more, Re S.J., No. T82/49 (Austl. Admin. App. Trib. Apr. 28, 1983);
an alien is deportable from France when the alien's presence on French territory constitutes a
serious threat to public order, Djeroud v. France, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 68 (1991). An alien is
deportable from Canada if the alien has been sentenced to more than six months imprisonment
and five or more years could have been imposed for the criminal violation, Canepa v. Canada
[1992] D.L.R. 4th 589. An alien is deportable from England when the alien's deportation would
be conducive to the public good, R.v. Immigr. App. Trib., Imm. A.R. 227 (Eng. 1987). An
alien is deportable from the United States when the alien commits a crime of moral turpitude, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1251 (1996).
6. Representative Schumer stated,
Mr. Speaker, in America there have always been paranoid extremists, ... I have sat
face to face with the victims of terrorism and the families of the victims of terrorism,
from Pan Am 103 through the World Trade Center bombing to the atrocity in
Oklahoma City. I have met them all. When I compare that pain and that danger to the
exaggerated rhetoric I hear from extremists about this bill, I fear for America and I
fear for the lives of ordinary Americans.
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without evidence that the Oklahoma City bombing was the work of
criminal aliens.7  This consensus knew no boundaries, espoused by both
black and white, bourgeoisie, and proletariat.
It is difficult to take a dispassionate look at the Oklahoma City
bombing because criticism of remedial measures might make the critic a
Judas, among us. Taking that for what it is worth, can one securely say
that a law which promises deportation if one engages in terrorist activities
has even one iota of deterrence effect to a person who has an ardent
passion to disrupt the American diaspora? Can we say that criminal alien
X will no longer blow up a building or release poisonous gases because of
the severe punishment of deportation? It would be logical to answer no to
these questions with the explanation that deportation is irrelevant because
most likely the commission of such crimes are accompanied with the
penalty of death.' Now it becomes clear that deportation is not a threat to
the terrorists but a threat to immigrants who, for whatever reason, commit
a crime punishable by one year or more.
142 CONG. REC. H3605, H3611 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement of Rep. Schumer).
7. Under the heading Middle-Eastern Suspect/Witness Sought, the author wrote:
At least three suspects/witnesses have reportedly been tentatively identified by the
federal bombing task force and one or more may have been taken into custody.
Several sources are reporting that three males of "middle-eastern extraction" are being
sought in Texas and Oklahoma, and that some witnesses are being questioned at this
hour by federal officers ....
(July 27, 1997) <http://www.emergency.com/oklabomb.htm>.
Clark Staten, the Executive Editor of ENN noted in his editorial perspective:
How could any number of these "experts" quickly jump to the conclusion that the
perpetrators in Oklahoma City were "Moslem Extremists"? Most of the law
enforcement officials and counter-terrorist analysts, interviewed by ENN, indicated
that it was a matter of historic and analytical perspective not a quest to justify the
condemnation of any ethnic group. Some, including ERRI, said that they had
considered a domestic connection to the Waco Branch Davidian incident because of the
date of the event, but had discounted it ag details of the type of bomb and the tactics
used were discovered. Most said that the circumstances surrounding the deadly
atrocity in Oklahoma were just too similar to those seen in Lebanon, Israel, Egypt,
England, and elsewhere to lead them to believe that this was a domestic attack....
(visited July 27, 1997) < http://www.emergency.com/oklabomb.htm >.
8. See 26 Mathew: 47-49. One treacherous enough to betray a friend; one who disguises
treachery as friendship. THE NEW GROLIER WEBSTER INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 521 (encyclopedic ed. 1972).
9. The United States Sentencing Guidelines provide in part that, "[the Commission has
concluded that in the absence of capital punishment life imprisonment is the appropriate
punishment for premeditated killing. However, this guideline also applies when death results
from the commission of certain felonies. Life imprisonment is not necessarily appropriate in all
such situations." (visited July 27, 1997) < http://www.ussc.gov/guide/ch2ta.htm>.
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law [Vol. 4:297
The final section points out the unfair effects the statute will have
on immigrants and the possibility and, most likely, certainty of abuse. The
past is not necessarily reflective of the future, but the United States has a
legacy of treating its own unfairly.10 Who will protect the immigrants?
II. FEDERAL COURT SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction in
all actions in which ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, or vice consuls
of a foreign state are parties." The Supreme Court also has original
jurisdiction in all controversies between the United States and a state, and
all actions by a state against the citizens of the United States or against
aliens.'2 Pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, Congress
promulgated title 28 section 1251 of the United States Code.'3 Congress
10. Intermarriage prohibited; meaning of term "white person"-It shall hereafter be
unlawful for any white person in this State to marry any save a white person, or a
person with no other admixture of blood than white and American Indian. For the
purpose of this chapter, the term "white person" shall apply only to such person as
have no trace whatever of any blood other than Caucasian; but persons who have one-
sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian and have no other non-Cacasic
blood shall be deemed to be white persons. All laws heretofore passed and now in
effect regarding the intermarriage of white and colored persons shall apply to
marriages prohibited by this chapter.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (1960 Repl. Vol.) reprinted in WALTER WADLINGTON, DOMESTIC
RELATIONS 35 N.H. (1995).
Colored persons and Indians defined-Every person in whom there is ascertainable any
Negro blood shall be deemed and taken to be a colored person, and every person not a
colored person having one fourth or more of American Indian blood shall be deemed
an American Indian; except that members of Indian tribes existing in this
Commonwealth having one forth or more Indian blood and less than one sixteenth of
Negro blood shall be deemed tribal Indians.
Id. § 1-14.
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 2.
12. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those
in which the state shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction.
In all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations
as the Congress shall make.
Id.
13. (a) The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies between two or more states. (b) The Supreme Court shall have original
but not exclusive jurisdiction of: 1) All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors,
other public ministers, consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties; 2) All
controversies between the United States and a state; 3) All actions or proceedings by a
state against the citizens of another state or against aliens.
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has the power under article III of the United States Constitution to expand
or contract the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts within the
limitations of article 111.14 This plenary power was unequivocally exercised
when Congress gave the Supreme Court the right to issue writs of
certiorari to hear appeals on final judgments involving federal questions. 15
Federal courts obtain their jurisdiction when the cause of action
involves a federal question,'6 or when the cause of action is based upon
complete diversity.' Federal courts inherently have limited subject matter
jurisdiction. 8 In Owen, Justice Stewart writing for the majority said, "It is
a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
The limit upon federal jurisdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution,
or by the Congress must be neither disregarded nor evaded." 9 Moreover,
even the federal courts themselves have espoused the idea of their limited
jurisdiction by imposing self-limitation.2 In Ankenbrandt'21 the Court said
that even though there may be subject matter jurisdiction by virtue of
diversity, the federal courts will not hear cases involving divorce, child
support, or alimony. 2 Thus the long stance of limited federal jurisdiction
is deeply rooted in the adjudicatory tradition of the federal courts.
28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1996).
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, Cl. 1.
15. The Supreme Court may review cases from the court of appeals by the following
methods: 1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or
criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree; 2) By certification atk
any time by a court of appeals of any question of law in any civil or criminal case as to
which instructions are desired, and upon such certification the Supreme Court may
give binding instructions or require the entire record to be sent up for decision of the
entire matter in controversy.
28 U.S.C.S. § 1254 (1996).
16. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 1996).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1996).
18. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
19. Id. at 374.
20. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
21. Id.
22. "[Tlhe domestic relations exception, as articulated by this Court since Barber, divests
the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees." Id. at 703,
112 S. Ct. at 2214, 119 L.Ed 2d at 469.
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The United States Congress has plenary power over immigration
which arguably comes from article I of the Constitution,2n or which
emanates from the infinite number of penumbras to the Constitution itself.
This is manifested by the creation of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, an executive agency which determines the number of aliens that
can legally enter the United States. It has been said that Congress gives
and Congress takes. This holds true for immigrants who have committed
crimes of moral turpitude by virtue of deportation.u4 "Any alien who is
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years
or ten years [in the case of a lawful resident] after date of entry, and is
convicted of a crime for which a sentence of one year or longer may be
imposed, is deportable."n
Ill. CRIMINAL GROUNDS FOR DEPORTATION
A. Australia
An immigrant who has committed a criminal offense punishable
for a period of one year or more is deportable from Australia as mandated
by the Migration Act of 1958, section 13(a).26 While the Australian courts
have recognized that, "the Australian community may take the view that it
prefers not to accept the criminal into its society," 27 the courts have not
rigidly followed this rule. This holds true although the S.J. court noted
that "the decision to deport may be made, not because the criminal
represents any significant future risk to the Australian community if he
remains . . . ."28 The deportation process for a criminal violation seems to
take on a two-step process in Australia. First, the criminal violation must
be punishable for a period of one year or more.2 9 Second, the court must
analyze whether the violation was a violent or nonviolent crime.30 If the
offense was violent, "the damage to the community that would flow from
23. "The Congress shall have the power ... [t]o establish a uniform rule of naturalization,
and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
24. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1251 (1996).
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(H)(ii)(I) (1996).
26. Re: S.J., No. T82/49 (Austi. Admin. App. Trib. Apr. 28, 1983).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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recidivism is great and must weigh heavily in favor of deportation." 3'
However, if the crime was nonviolent such as false pretense, the order
granting deportation will be revoked because there is "comparatively little
damage likely to be suffered by any person in particular or by the
community in general." 32 This bifurcation between violent and nonviolent
crimes seems to be rationally based on a wise policy decision because it
would be safe to infer that violent criminals pose the most serious threat to
the community. However, this form of analysis is absent from American
jurisprudence. 31 In fact, one could be deported from the United States for a
nonviolent offense simply because it is punishable by one year or more.
34
Thus a legal immigrant could be deported for voting in a federal election.35
It is simply wrong to conclude that Australia has the more preferable
system. Deference and earned respect should be given to the American
Legislatures for their policy rationale of excluding, and when appropriate
deporting criminal aliens.
B. France
Criminal aliens are deportable from France when the alien's
presence on French territory constitutes a serious threat to public order
pursuant to the Order (Ordonnance) of 2 November 1945 on the conditions
for alien entry into and residence in France.
6
31. Id.
32. Re.: S.J., No T82/49 (Austi. Admin. App. Trib. Apr. 28, 1983).
33. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 110 Stat. 1214.
34. "Any alien who at any time after entry has been convicted of a violation of [or a
conspiracy or attempt to violate] any law or regulation of a state, the United States, or a foreign
country relating to a controlled substance ... is deportable." 8 U.S.C.S. § 1251(a)(H)(2)(B)(I)
(1996); "Any alien who is, or any time after entry has been, a drug abuser or addict is
deportable." 8 U.S.C.S. § 1251(a)(H)(2)(B)(ii) (1996); "Any alien who, within five years after
the date of entry, has become a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have arisen
since entry is deportable." 8 U.S.C.S. § 1251(a)(H)(4)(D)(5) (1996).
35. Section 216 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 states in part that:
[it shall be unlawful for any alien to vote in any election held solely or in part for the
purpose of electing a candidate for the office of President, Vice President, Presidential
elector, Member of the Senate, Member of the House or Representatives, Delegate
from the District of Columbia, or Resident Commissioner . . . . Any person who
violates this section shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than one year,
or both.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208
(1996).
36. Djeroud v. France, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 68 (1991).
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However, even though a criminal alien may pose a serious threat
to public order or public credit, it does not automatically mean that the
alien will be deported. For instance, an alien who is, 1) a minor under
eighteen; or 2) an alien who can prove that he or she has been a resident of
France for more than fifteen years; or 3) an alien who over the past twenty
years has not been definitively sentenced to a term of at least one year's
imprisonment without suspension, or without several terms of
imprisonment without suspension totaling at least one year, is not subject
to deportation." Moreover, a person cannot be deported if deportation
would result in degrading treatment or torture in the person's home
country.,, This comes with two exceptions. First, an alien "sentenced to
an unsuspended term of imprisonment of any duration for an offense
covered by section 4 and 8 of Act 73-548 of June 1973 concerning
collective housing is deportable." 9 Second, except aliens under eighteen,
an alien is deportable in a case of imperative urgency when it constitutes an
absolute necessity for the security of the state or for public safety.4
C. Canada
Criminal aliens are deportable from Canada pursuant to the
Immigration Act of 1976 where: 1) the immigrant has been sentenced to
more than six months imprisonment, and 2) five or more years could have
been imposed for the criminal violation.4'
In early English common law, some foreign born nationals were
classified as denizens.4 2 These are "aliens born, but who has obtained ex
donatione regis letters patent to make him an English subject: a high and
incommunicable branch of the royal prerogative."4 3 Canepa v. Canada"
involved an alien claiming a denizen status. The Canepa court rejected the
doctrine noting the absence of stare decisis, and espoused the idea that
alien rights must be found under the Canadian Charter . 4  The Canepa
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Canepa v. Canada [1992] D.L.R. 4th 589.
42. W.C. SPRAGUE, BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 65
(1895) reprinted in Canepa v. Canada [1992] D.L.R. 4th 589.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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court also noted that "[t]he most fundamental principle of immigration law
is that noncitizens do not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in..
[Canada]."" This logically extends to the court's conclusion that
deportation is not a punishment, and even if it was, it is not "cruel and
unusual" because it is not excessive as to outrage standards of decency .4
D. England
A person who is not a British citizen is subject to deportation from
the United Kingdom if the Secretary of State finds that his deportation
would be "conducive to the public good. "4 8 The actual definition of what
is "conducive to the public good" is unknown. However, House of
Common paper 159 states that "each case will be considered in light of the
relevant circumstances known to the Secretary of State . . . ."9
Furthermore, an alien ordered deported from the United Kingdom can only
be heard to argue that his deportation violates a treaty in which England is
a party if Parliament adopts the treaty5 ° This is because "[tireaties and
declarations do not become [English] law until they are made law by
Parliament. "I'
In deciding whether to execute a deportation order, the Secretary
of State must use
every relevant factor known to him, including: age; length
of residence in the United Kingdom; strength of connection
with the United Kingdom; personal history, including
character, conduct and employment record; domestic
circumstances; the nature of the offense of which the
person was convicted; previous criminal record;
compassionate circumstances; [and] any representations
received on the person's behalf ....
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. R. v. Immigr. App. Trib., Imm. A.R. 227 (Eng. 1987).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Imm. A.R. 277 (quoting House of Commons paper 156).
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E. United States
Aliens who have committed "crimes of moral turpitude" are
subject to deportation and exclusion from the United States.53 This is
because crimes involving moral turpitude are regarded as evil, and persons
committing such crimes have squalid moral sentiment towards the
community. The logic behind deporting aliens who have committed crimes
of moral turpitude stems from the notion that the United States was
generous and overly benevolent in opening its borders to foreign nationals
who have the opportunity to reap the benefits that the United States has to
offer.
An alien who is recalcitrant to the laws of the United States shows
disrespect to the American diaspora, and the establishment of civility.
Such aliens who commit crimes of moral turpitude constructively
relinquish all privileges to be domiciled in the United States. The crimes
that have been traditionally held as "crimes of moral turpitude" within the
meaning of United States immigration laws4 all seem to be specific intent
crimes. 5 The only exception is rape, a general intent crime,5' which is also
regarded as a crime of moral turpitude.
Prior to the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, aliens, whether convicted of a criminal offense or
not, could appeal a final order of deportation to the federal courts.17 On
April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act. 8  This Act truncates the federal court's power to hear
53. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1251 (1996).
54. Bribery is a crime of moral turpitude, see United States v. Esperdy, 285 F.2d 341 (2d
Cir. 1961), cert. denied 366 U.S. 905 (1961); Forgery and Embezzlement are crimes of moral
turpitude, Baer v. Norene, 79 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1935); Perjury is a crime of moral turpitude,
United States v. Uhl, 70 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied 293 U.S. 573 (1934); Murder is a
crime of moral turpitude, Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 162 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1947), rev'd on
other grounds 333 U.S. 6 (1947). But see Sallano v. Doak, 5 F. Supp; 561 (1933). Sex offenses
are crimes of moral turpitude, Marinelli v. Ryan, 285 F.2d 474 ( 2d Cir.1961). Even consensual
sodomy is a crime of moral turpitude, Velez-Lozana v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305 (D.C. 1972); Tax
offenses are crimes of moral turpitude, Costello v. INS, 311 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on
other grounds, 376 U.S. 120 (1964); Weapon offenses are also crimes involving moral turpitude,
Re S 8 I & N Dec. (BIA 1959).
55. Specific intent designates "a special mental element which is required above and
beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime." State v.
Bridgeforth, 750 P.2d 3, 5 (Ariz. 1988).
56. State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978).
57. Kladis v. INS, 343 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1965).
58. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996).
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deportation cases on appeal in which the deportee has been convicted of a
criminal violation.5 9
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE
DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996
The jurisdictional limitation section of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which will instigate fervent
constitutional debate on the viability of immigration law, states in part that
"[any final order of deportation against an alien who is deportable by
reason of having committed a criminal offense covered by section
241(a)(2)(A)(i), shall not be subject to review by any court."6
Noteworthy, and perhaps what can be termed as a troubling
epiphenomenon, was an issue pointed out by Representative Velazquez.
Representative Velazquez remonstrated about the fact that the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act is rooted in a bill that was
rushed through Congress without adequate deliberation to meet the
anniversary deadline of the Oklahoma City bombing.6' Surely the Act does
not hide its meaning or purpose; 2 however, constitutionality of statutes are
judged on the basis of whether rights guaranteed by the Constitution are
deprived or unreasonably infringed, or whether Congress' action is within
the purview of the Constitution itself.63
The intriguing question now becomes whether the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 is a valid exercise of Congress'
power pursuant to article III of the United States Constitution, or whether
Congressional action usurps federal court subject matter jurisdiction. In
Marbury v. Madison, Justice Marshall said that the Supreme Court of the
United States is the final arbiter of the Constitution." Thus, it is upon the
established precedents of the Supreme Court that Congress' actions must
be judged.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 142 CONG. REc. H3612 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996). Representative Velazquez in
disgust said, "Mr. Speaker, rushing this bill to the floor to meet a publicity deadline is
irresponsible. Once again we are sacrificing our people to play election year politics.
Americans and their civil rights are too important to allow this." Id.
62. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945). Justice Learned Hand writing
about deciphering the meaning and purpose of statutes wrote, "[Ilt is one of the surest indexes of
a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to
remember that statutes always have some purpose or objective to their meaning." Id.
63. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
64. Id.
1997] 307
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In Ex Parte McCardle, the Supreme Court explicated the
limitations that can be placed on the federal courts' subject matter
jurisdiction.0 McCardle involved a petitioner who filed for a writ of
habeas corpus alleging unlawful restraint by the military force." The writ
was issued and returned to the military commander. McCardle was not in
the military but was held in the custody of the military because he had
published articles allegedly incendiary and libelous. Upon a hearing,
McCardle was remanded to military custody. McCardle appealed to the
Supreme Court, and his case was heard before the Justices. Before the
decision was rendered, Congress repealed the February 5, 1867 Act which
gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear the matter. Chief Justice
Chase, writing for the majority noted that "[wie are not at liberty to
inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its
power under the Constitution, and the power to make exceptions to the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court is given by the express words. "67 This
opinion removed all obfuscation and doubt of Congress' power to limit the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. In fact, the opinion went on further to
say that the opinions or motives of Congress are irrelevant." Under the
McCardle framework, Congress could remove the subject matter
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts even if Congress was motivated by some
form of animus. However, Ex Parte McCardle does not stand for the
proposition that Congress' power is absolute in jurisdictional expansion
and limitation.
United States v. Klein involved a statute passed by Congress which
gave the President the power to grant pardons and return property to
individuals who were thought to be in opposition of the United States.69 On
August 12, 1863, the President granted Wilson a pardon; on January 1,
1867, the Act giving the President the power to grant pardons was
repealed. Three years later in 1870, Congress passed another Act which
stated that any pardons granted to any person by the President because
such persons were disloyal are invalid. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in the case shall cease and the court shall forthwith dismiss
the suit of such claimant.70 The Court reasoned that if the Act only denied
the right of appeal in a particular class of cases, there would be no doubt
65. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 513.
68. Id.
69. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871).
70. See id. at 129.
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Congress' action was constitutional.71 However, the Court went on to say
that Congress ventured into another coordinate branch of the government
when it would ex post facto override an executive decision of the
President. The Court stated, "We must think that Congress has
inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legislative from the
judicial power."72 Therefore, although there is no doubt that Congress may
limit the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, Congress must be
certain that it does not step into the department of another coordinate
branch of the government. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 does not pose the separation of powers problem
illuminated in Klein. The Act, without usurping any executive power
simply states that a deportee will not have a right to review in federal
courts because of the deportee's deportable status as a convicted criminal. 3
This in no way infringes on the executive branch of the government, but
simply limits the federal courts' jurisdiction.
The principle of stare decisis answered the constitutionality of the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 in 1850 in
Sheldon v. Sill." In Sheldon, the Judicial Act prohibited the federal courts
from hearing cases in any suit to recover the contents of any promissory
note. The Supreme Court in upholding the constitutionality of the statute
said:
[I]f the Constitution had ordained and established the
inferior courts, and distributed to them their respective
powers, they could not be restricted or divested by
Congress . . . . [H]aving a right to prescribe, Congress
may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of
any of the enumerated controversies. Courts created by
statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute
confers. No one of them can assert a just claim to
jurisdiction exclusively conferred on another, or withheld
from all.75
This same linear form of reasoning was also expounded in Lauf v.
Shinner.76 Lauf involved a statute enacted by Congress which provided that
71. Id. at 145.
72. Id. at 147.
73. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 110 Stat. 1214.
74. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441 (1850).
75. Id. at 448.
76. Laufv. Shinner, 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
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no court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or
permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor
dispute." The Court in upholding the constitutionality of the statute said,
"[T]here can be no question of the power of Congress thus to define and
limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States." 8
Likewise, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 falls within the same ambit of congressional definition and limitation
of the federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction. The Act affirmatively
limits the federal courts' jurisdiction to review cases involving deportable
aliens who have been convicted of a criminal violation. It is upon this
same principle that Ex Parte McCardle9 and its progeny are based. "[The
appellate powers of the [Supreme] Court are not given by the judicial act,
but are given by the Constitution," they are, nevertheless, "limited and
regulated by. . . acts [of Congress] . . . ."1 The Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts have long recognized that the federal judicial system is
inherently limited, and that Congress may define and limit the federal
court's subject matter jurisdiction within the purview of article 111.81
An alien who has been convicted of a criminal offense and
subsequently ordered deported cannot argue but for the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act he would have had a fundamental right to
appeal. 82 The right to appeal is not a fundamental right. It is a legislative
grace which can be given and taken away by Congress. In Ross v. Moffitt,
the Supreme Court said that the government is not obliged to provide an
appeal after a conviction." Moreover, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act only prevents judicial review of a deportation order.
The Act does not preclude criminal aliens from appealing their criminal
convictions. But even if the Act did, it would still not run afoul of the
Constitution because there is no fundamental right to judicial review.M
77. Id. at 327.
78. Id. at 330.
79. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
80. Id. at 513.
81. U.S. CONST. art. III.
82. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). The Court held that a state need not
provide any appeal at all. Based on this rationale, the same principle applies to the Federal
government.
83. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
84. Id. at 606.
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V. THE CERTAINTY OF FAIRNESS IS FOREVER GONE
Representative Scott in opposing the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act said, "[O]ur rights [will be dilapidated] if we have
secret trials where people can be deported, based on evidence presented in
private . . . ." At first glance the Representative's statement might seem
like a hyperbole. However, the practical effect of the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Act is that it will run into procedural irregularities. There
are no safeguards in the Act to decipher whether criminal aliens are given
fair deportation hearings.16 The fact that there is a deportation hearing
should not lead one to the conclusion that criminal aliens are afforded their
procedural safeguards under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. In
fact, what the Act has done is similar to what the lawmakers in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins 7 did. The Board of Immigration appeals will have plenary power
to determine which criminal alien gets deported, without their actions
reviewable by the detached judiciary u This leaves ajar the door for
possible abuses which will go uncorrected. The logical question one might
ask is, "What about procedural due process?" Procedural due process is
not guaranteed for a criminal alien facing deportation under this new Act. 9
This dogmatic condition has not always been the case.90 In
Mendoza, the defendants were arrested in Lincoln, Nebraska on October
23, 1984. They were deported on November 1, 1984. On December 12,
1984, they were once again separately arrested in Lincoln, Nebraska.
While being prosecuted for illegal entry into the United States, the
defendants asserted a collateral attack on their prior deportation hearing.
The defendants claimed that the Immigration Law Judge inadequately
informed them of their right to counsel at the hearing. The defendants also
contend that they unknowingly waived their right to a suspension of
deportation. The Supreme Court held that the prior deportation hearing
violated the aliens' procedural due process rights. 9 The Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act permanently precludes this type of
collateral attack on a deportation order. Abuses like that in Mendoza are
85. Supra note 6 (statement of Rep. Schumer).
86. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 110 Stat. 1214.
87. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the ordinance gave certain counsel
members plenary power to issue licenses to operate laundry service. The counsel members used
this power to effectuate their racial animus towards the Chinese immigrants.
88. See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 110 Stat. 1214.
89. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 110 Stat. 1214.
90. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
91. Id. at 837.
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bound to occur in the application of this new Act. The only problem is
that the criminal aliens who are stripped of their procedural safeguards will
no longer have redress in the courts of law.
For illustration purposes assume X, an immigrant, was born in the
middle east. He is now twenty-five years old, and has been residing
legally in the United States for the last twenty-three years. In all respects
but for his nationality, X is a typical twenty-five-year-old American.
Recently, X's girlfriend broke up with him and as a result X has been
calling her continuously. She took umbrage to this and obtained a
protective order against X. Assume further that after the protective order
was issued, the court found that X was in violation. What result? Under
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
X is deportable.92 At the deportation hearing the trier of facts is Judge
Unfair who lives up to her name. She abused her power and discretion
and ordered X deported. What result? X is going back to the Middle
East.93 "Any final order of deportation against an alien who is deportable
by reason of having committed a criminal offense shall not be subject to
review by any court. "94
Stupified? Flabbergasted? This outcome is fundamentally wrong.
What about the length of X's residence in the United States? What about
the strength of X's connection to the United States? What about X's
personal history? What about the nature of the offense which X allegedly
committed? What about the fact that X has no previous criminal record?
These are all questions which should be answered before X, or any other
92. Any alien who at any time after entry is enjoined under protection order issued by
a court and whom the court determines has engaged in conduct that violates the portion
of a protection order that involves protection against credible threats of violence,
repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection
was order was issued is deportable. For purposes of this clause, the term 'protection
order' means any injunction issued for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening
acts of domestic violence, including temporary or final orders issued by civil or
criminal courts . . . whether obtained by filing an independent action or as a pendente
lite order in another proceeding.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208
(1996).
93. The author intentionally omitted the sentences, "X is going back home." This is
because it cannot reasonably be said that the Middle East is X's home. He has been away for
almost all his life; he grew up in a different setting, culture, values, norms and traditions. In all
respects, X is an American.
94. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 110 Stat. 1214.
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immigrant, is deported. A sound immigration policy is necessary, a fair
one is paramount."
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal court jurisprudence has laid the principle that Congress,
pursuant to article III of the United States Constitution, may define and
limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, though dogmatic to some, effectuates
this well established principle. In essence, this is the same type of
limitation that the federal courts have upheld since time immemorial.
What remains is the lost cries of immigrants wrongly deported. The
United States Constitution guarantees many things, the notable exception
being moral fairness. The Australian, French, Canadian, and English
cases all point out a process which is no longer available in the United
States: review by the independent judiciary.
One cannot blame the American legislatures for abhorring criminal
aliens, and their efforts to get them out of the United States as quickly as
possible. One also should not question the Legislatures' motive;9 but this
paper questions the wisdom of the termination of judicial review by the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. We can be tough on
criminal aliens without trampling on and rampantly traversing the Due
Process Clause.
95. The author offers no conclusion or opinion as to whether the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act is fair, but made statements so that the reader can ponder and
conclude without influence as to fairness.
96. See generally supra note 6.
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